Risk as a Proxy for Race
Bernard E. Harcourt 2 that "risk (and some evidence-based practices) may facilitate a reduction in penal populations, and over time lead to the application of different and perhaps more constructive interventions" (39).
Hannah-Moffat anticipates the potential problems and criticisms and is, herself, genuinely concerned about the prejudices and biases-especially the racial biases-that may ensue. But the careful grammatical structure of the sentences suggests that, ultimately, Hannah-Moffat is encouraging us to reconsider the progressive argument for risk.
This raises the significant question whether, indeed, risk assessment tools should be embraced as a progressive method to disassemble our carceral state-or, more precisely, whether we need more research to revisit the issue. My sense is that the answer to both of these questions is "no." I would argue that we should resist the political temptation to reconsider the progressive argument for riskprediction for the central reason that the use of risk-assessment tools to decrease prison populations, first, will unquestionably aggravate the already intolerable racial imbalance in our prison populations (at least in the United States) and second, will not address the real source of mass incarceration, namely the front-end admissions process. The fact is, risk today has collapsed into prior criminal history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race. The combination of these two trends means that using risk-assessment tools is going to significantly aggravate the unacceptable racial disparities in our criminal justice system.
There are, to be sure, political advantages to using technical instruments such as actuarial tools to justify prison releases. Risk-assessment tools protect political actors and serve to de-responsibilize decision-makers. Given that we are in an age of "governing through crime," these are undoubtedly important. But I think that this advantage is outweighed by the cost to racial justice. In the end, I believe we need to find other solutions to mass incarceration. Before making the argument, though, let me start here with a few cautionary tales about progressive arguments for prediction.
I. Cautionary Tales on Prediction
This is not the first time that we might be tempted to use a metric of dangerousness as a way to empty "total institutions." We did the same thing with our asylums and mental hospitals in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. One thing that experiment revealed was that the turn to dangerousness had a distinctly disproportionate effect on African- A second cautionary tale: selective incapacitation. Here, it is important to recall that the development of selective incapacitation in the 1970s was joined at the hip with the goal of reducing prison populations. One of the leading arguments for selective incapacitation in California was precisely the progressive line that it would lower overall prison populations while reducing crime. As we all know, the theory of selective incapacitation, which traced to the seminal research of Marvin Wolfgang, Robert Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin (1972) , rested on the idea that only a small subset of youth-in their study, 627 youths or 6.3 percent of the cohort-was responsible for over 50 percent of the total crimes committed by the cohort (Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin 1972: 248) . The modern idea of selective incapacitation grew from this insight: locking up those 6 percent, and only those 6 percent, could cut crime in half, while at the same time reducing prison populations. The problem, naturally, became how to identify the 6 percent chronic offenders and the solution, as naturally, was to turn to actuarial methods. When Peter Greenwood and Allan Abrahamse issued their RAND report in 1982-the report that set forth the most fully articulated plan for implementing a strategy of selective incapacitationthey made clear that the benefit of selective incapacitation was that it saved money by reducing prison populations. Their seven-factor prediction instrument 2 was attractive, they argued, because it had the advantage of reducing the prison population. Greenwood and his colleagues concluded their study precisely on that note: "Increasing the accuracy with which we can identify high-rate offenders or increasing the selectivity of sentencing policies can lead to a decrease in crime, a decrease in the prison population, or both. Selective incapacitation is a way of increasing the amount of crime prevented by a given level of incarceration" (Greenwood 1982: xiii, emphasis added Today, risk is predominantly tied to prior criminal history, and prior criminality has become a proxy for race. The result is that deinstitutionalizing through the mechanism of risk-instruments is likely to aggravate the racial disparities in our hyper-segregated carceral sphere. The evolution from race to risk can be traced neatly by examining the factors used in risk-assessment tools during the early to midtwentieth century. From their inception in the 1920s to at least the 1970s, many of the prediction tools explicitly used the nationality and race of the parents of the inmate as one of the central factors to predict future dangerousness. This practice ebbed in the 1970s as a result of the Civil Rights movement and constitutional developments in Equal Protection, but was nevertheless replaced with two other trends-the narrowing of the prediction instruments and the focusing of those tolls on prior criminal history. The combined effect of these various trends has been to turn risk into a proxy for race.
a. Race as an early predictor of parole failure
The first parole prediction instrument that was ever used in the parole decisionmaking process-the "Burgess method" developed in 1927 and 1928 by Professor Ernest Burgess at the University of Chicago-included the nationality or race of the father as one of twenty-one factors that predicted success or failure on parole (Harcourt 2007:57 Id. Burgess' model was implemented by the Illinois Board of Paroles in 1933 and, as a result, nationality and race were used expressly as a factor in the "prognasio" that served as the basis for the decision whether or not to parole an inmate. Race and nationality predicted parole violation.
The use of parent nationality, race, color, and other ethnic identifiers, such as religious belief and church attendance, was a continuous thread that weaved through the evolution of the parole prediction studies and instruments, at least into the 1970s. In 1931, Clark Tibbitts, the former assistant In terms of actuarial instruments that would actually be implemented, Burgess (1928 ), Tibbits (1931 ), and Hakeem (1948 all included race and nationality of the father in the prediction instrument. I discuss many of these tools in Against Prediction (2007), but failed there to mention whether the prediction instruments included race. I remedy that in a table in the Appendix here, a table which lists the major prediction studies and tools developed in the early to mid-twentieth century in the United
States. The table discloses the use of race, nationality, or religion-and whether the tools were actually implemented. The table reveals a continued use of race until at least the late 1960s. In fact, when California began using a parole prediction instrument in the 1970s, it used an actuarial device that relied on race. The first California "Base/Expectancy Score" narrowed in on race and only three other factorsprior commitments, offense type and number of escapes (Simon 1993:173) .
The link was not only direct, it was also at times metaphorical. Clark Tibitts, for instance, in his 1931 replication of the Burgess method referred to "white marks" and "black marks." So, he wrote, "A record of no work . . . which shows a violation rate of 38.5 percent would be an unfavorable sign or what we have chosen to call 'a black mark,' while a good work record with only 5.6 percent failure would be favorable or 'a white mark.' The rates of violation either above or below the average permit the factors Risk as a Proxy for Race Bernard E. Harcourt 6 to be listed . . . according to whether they are favorable or unfavorable, 'white' or 'black'" (Tibbitts 1931:40) . Not surprisingly-though one has to wonder whether Tibbitts caught the lack of irony-being "American (Colored)" was a "black mark" and being "American (White)" was a "white mark" (Tibbitts 1931:43) .
b. Narrowing on Prior Criminal History
The actuarial instruments ultimately evolved away from race as an explicit predictor, but that trend was accompanied by two others-and these too would have significant race effects: first, a general reduction in the number of predictive factors used and, second, an increased focus on prior criminal history.
The first trend was fueled by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck. Score" that used only seven predictive factors (and the majority of those seven factors related to prior delinquency). California adopted an actuarial model, the "Base/Expectancy Score," that narrowed in on four factors. 5 The narrowing of the prediction instruments can be visualized by plotting the number of factors used in parole prediction models over time and drawing a regression line through the plot:
Risk as a Proxy for Race Bernard E. Harcourt The second trend focused the predictors on prior criminal history as a proxy for future dangerousness. Practically all of the prediction studies converged on prior correctional contacts (arrests, convictions, and incarcerations) as one of the stronger predictors of recidivism. What developed, as a result, were more simplistic but easier to administer sentencing schemes that relied predominantly on prior criminal history (see generally Gendreau et al 1996) . This is reflected well in the views of Paul Robinson, former commissioner on the United States Sentencing Commission and a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania:
The rationale for heavy reliance upon criminal history in sentencing guidelines is its effectiveness in incapacitating dangerous offenders. Whether prior criminal justice contact actually works to predict high or low risk offenders remains unclear, especially given the failure of most research to account for the non-random assignment to penal treatments (Bushway and Smith 2007) . But what is clear is that prior criminality has become the predictor of choice in sentencing.
